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I. INTRODUCTION

The measures of the Union have not been executed; the delinquencies of
the States have, step by step, matured themselves to an extreme, which
has at length arrested all the wheels of the national government, and
brought them to an awful stand. . . . Each state, yielding to the pdrsuasive voice of immediate interest or convenience, has successively withdrawn its support, till the frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall
upon our heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins.'
The words of Hamilton serve as poignant testimony to the dismal failure of
the Articles of Confederation. Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison argued
in the Federahst for state ratification of the document which would subsequently
become the Constitution of the United States. 2 It was the well-recognized reality
of the inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation that led to the drafting and
eventual ratification of the Constitution of the United States.
Any person possessing even a passing acquaintance with American history
knows that the Constitution created a viable national government to replace the
ineffective central government fashioned by the Articles. 3 It is axiomatic that the
Constitution created a federal government that set forth the framework for the
interrelationships between and among the states and the national government.
* This article is a revised version of a talk presented at the Second Annual Rocky Mountain Mineral
Foundation Institute for Law Teachers in Boulder, Colorado on May 25-27, 1983.
The author would like to extend special thanks to Sheila L. O'Regan for valuable research assistance.
** Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. A.B., 1968, Dickinson College; J.D.,
1971, Duke University.
I THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 76 (A. Hamilton) (Gideon Ed. 1831).
2 L. LEVY, ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1969).
3
See generally THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1; L. LEVY, supra note 2.
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The national government was vested with certain ennumerated powers. 4 By
later amendment the Constitution provided that those powers not delegated to
the national government nor otherwise prohibited were reserved to the states and
to the people. 5 However, the precise relationship of the states and the national
government in this "federal" scheme has long been the subject of rancorous debate. 6 In the nation's infancy Thomas Jefferson decried the demise of the states'
role in our federal system in the following way:
I see, as you do, and with the deepest affliction, the rapid strides with
which the federal branch of our government is advancing towards the
usurpation of all the rights reserved to the States, and the consolidation in
itself of all powers, foreign and domestic; and that, 7too, by constructions
which, if legitimate, leave no limits to their power.
This clash of state and federal interests has been a consistent theme throughout American history. The nation has experienced many tumultous disputes between states and the national government. The Civil War, Roosevelt's "New
Deal," and the battle to integrate racially segregated schools recall only a few
such confrontations.
Our Supreme Court has often been called upon to arbitrate federalism issues.
Fundamental disagreement about the basic nature of "federalism" is as prevalent
in the judiciary as it is in other sectors of American society.8
As the bicentennial of the ratification of the Constitution of the United States
approaches, the federal versus states' rights debate continues with renewed vigor.
President Ronald Reagan's "New Federalism" 9 symbolizes the political philosophy of his administration. This "new" federalism, in essence, seeks to greatly
reduce the scope of federal activity in domestic matters and expand the power
and capability of states and local governments to fill the void left by a retrenching national bureaucracy. When candidate Reagan spoke of "getting the
government off the backs of the people" during the 1980 presidential campaign
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
5

1d. at amend. X. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("The amendment states but
a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."); see also National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 6U.S. 833 (1976).
See generally C. BEARD, THE ENDURING FEDERALIST 6 (1948); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 171 (1980); THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1;La Pierre, The Political
Safeguards ofFederalism Redux: IntergovernmentalImmunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q.
779 (1982); Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism.- The Role of the States in Composition and Selection of
the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
7 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Branch Giles (Dec. 26, 1825) (reprintedinTHOMAS JEFFERSON ON CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: SELECTED WRITINGS, 1787-1825 (Va. Comm'n on Const'al Gov't
1962)).
8
See generally J. CHOPER, supra note 6. For a current example of judicial disagreement on the role of
the states under the Constitution, see Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 103 S.Ct.
1054 (compare concurring opinion of Stevens, J., with dissenting opinion of Powell, J.).
9 State of the Union Address, 128 CONG. REC. H51-55 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1982). It is noteworthy that
the term "new federalism" was advanced by President Richard Nixon in the course of his first State of the
Union Address of hissecond term. Nixon surprised an unwary nation with his "New Federalism" proposal
which emphasized the return to state and local government of large areas of substantive responsibility and
greater amounts of revenue. The nation, torn by war and political unrest, was not prepared to deal with
such reorganization. In contrast, the appeal of Reagan's version of "New Federalism" can be understood
in light of developments which took place in the 1970s: rapid and seemingly uncontrolled expansion of the
federal bureaucracy and an unstable national economy and concurrent expansive growth of the federal
debt. These factors have contributed significantly to the rising tide of public opposition to federal
regulation.
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his comments were directed toward the federal and not state governments. 0
Once in office the Reagan Administration has been faced with the reality of
transforming political slogans into positive action. The focus of this essay is the
federalism debate as it touches upon two issues: first, the role of the federal government in protecting the environment, and second, the state-federal relationship
as it relates to federal lands policy-a controversy which has led to what has been
termed the "sagebrush rebellion."''
This debate is frequently fraught with political rhetoric and invective. Such
subjective conflict causes both the casual observer and those well acquainted
with environmental and federal lands issues to lose sight of how our federal system was intended to work and of how it has actually worked over almost two
centuries. This essay presents no startling hypothesis; it simply attempts to bring
to the debate a much needed historical and political perspective generally lost in
partisan conflict.
II.

CRITICISM OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS

A. FederalRole in Environmental Protection
The decade of the 1970s brought a dramatic change in the relationship of the
national government to the states regarding environmental protection. Generally this change was in the direction of a predominant and preemptive federal
legislative and administrative presence in the field.' 2 The expansion of federal
power in this area was premised primarily on the need for uniform national regulatory standards and national economic and security concerns. Ineffective state
and local regulation also contributed to the expansion of federal power. Several
of these federal legislative enactments showed some sensitivity for "states rights"
by creating a regulatory process of federal standard setting and voluntary state
implementation and enforcement-a format that has been termed "cooperative
federalism."' 3 One commentator has noted that "[c]ooperative federalism em10 Interestingly, Justice Douglas coined the phrase "get government off the backs of the people" in
Columbia Broadcasting Service v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 162 (1973).
' 1 See generally Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment. An IntergovernmentalPerspective of the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENvTL. L. 847 (1982); Coggins, Evans & Lundberg-Johnson, The Law of Publi Rangeland Management . The Extent and Dittribution of Federal Power, 12 ENVTL. L. 535, 572-77 (1982); Huffman, Governing
America's Resources.- Federalism i the 1980"s, 12 ENVrrL. L. 863, 895 (1982); Leshy, Unraveling The Sagebrush
Rebellion.Law, Politics and FederalLands, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 317 (1980).
2
1 See, e.g., Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. V 1981); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA), as amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1328 (Supp. 11 1978); Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(0-3000) (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980); Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976); Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1982) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10,101); The Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (Superfund), 26 U.S.C. §§ 1 note, 4611, 4612,
4661, 4662, 4681, 4682, 33 U.S.C. § 1364, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6911, 6911 (a), 9601-9615, 9631-9633, 9641, 9651,
9657, 49 U.S.C. § 11901 (Supp. IV 1980 and scattered sections of Supp. V 1981); Toxic Substances Act
(TOSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rhodenticide Act (FIFRA),
7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1976).
13 Statutes which include a "cooperative federalism" approach include the Clean Air Act, Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act. See supra note 12 for statutory cites. Typical of such statutory schemes is the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act which provides for its enforcement by any state which can show that
it has the resources and legal mechanisms to effectively carry out the congressional mandate of the statute.
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phasizes decentralizing national power, returning functions and responsibilities
to states and localities where local options can prevail, and most important, [it
14
recognizes] the interdependence of federal and state governments."'
B. Criticism of FederalEnvironmental Regulation
Notwithstanding Congressional attempts to create cooperative federalism,
both the statutory framework and the administrative implementation of such
federal laws as the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act have become the targets of a rising crescendo of
vehement criticism from many state officials and from the business and industrial
community.' 5 The rhetoric generated in response to the new, heightened federal
role in environmental regulation focuses on what opponents characterize as a
usurpation of an important state role in the federal system. State leaders also
perceive federal administrative and regulatory activities to be arrogant, impractical, overly expensive and otherwise oppressive.
Attacks on federal environmental regulation are well summarized in the comments of two individuals. The first is James R. Harris, the Director of the Office
of Surface Mining ("OSM") in the Reagan Administration. Mr. Harris' 6 recently made the following remarks:
The problems of centralized and unresponsive government are especially
acute in environmental programs. Many of these programs epitomize the
abuses which led to the demand for change.
• . . The shift to executive branch regulation brought about a major
centralization of power. In some cases, federal legislation gave power directly to federal agencies; in other cases, federal agencies indirectly assumed direction and control of state functions. EPA and OSM required
states to meet extensive controls and standards; states that failed to do so
faced funding cutbacks or direct federal intervention. MSHA took over
direct regulation of mine health and safety, and most state programs vanished. The state environmental programs that expanded did so with federal money that had strings attached. By 1980 the states were, in effect,
running federal programs for the federal government. The states were
drowning in a flood of federal procedures and regulations.
The centralization of power resulted in a growing federal bureaucracy.
Not only did the federal regulatory agencies grow, they funded and controlled growing state agencies. This growth caused huge increases in the
costs of governing. It took a big staff to administer detailed requirements
at the state level, and a big staff of federal workers to check the state
States which qualify to take over enforcement of the Act from EPA must have adequate legal and technical staff to implement enforcement and laws which are at least as stringent as federal law and regulations.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 40 C.F.R. § 123.1 (d)(e) (1982). Less stringent provisions
of state law are preempted. See general'y, Stewart, Pramids of Sacrifte? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of NationalEnvironmental Pol/cy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977). The term "cooperative feder-

alism" came into vogue during the Eisenhower Administration. See Elazar, The Resurgance ofFederalism, in
THE UNEASY PARTNERSHIP 305 (R. Feld and C. Graften eds. 1973).

14 Lyons, Federahm and Resource Development. A New Role for States.?, 12 ENVTL. L. 931, 934 (1982).
also Lutz, Interstate Environmental Law. Federahm Bordering on Neglect?, 13 Sw. L. REV. 573 (1983).
15 Se infra notes 16-26 and accompanying text.

See

16 Prior to his appointment to the OSM directorship, an agency of the State of Indiana employed
James Harris to enforce the state's surface coal mining reclamation laws. In that position Harris was
instrumental in challenging initial Office of Surface Mining (OSM) regulatory activities after the enactment of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) in 1977. See Hodel v. Indiana, 452
U.S. 314 (1981).

1983]

FEDERALISM LIVES

workers. Federal grants and regulations dictated staff and funding levels
for states, and states lost control of their budgets.
The cost of doing business increased too. Some cost increases were
valid expenditures to protect the environment. But other increases were a
waste of resources, caused by inflexible requirements and inappropriate
technology. Rigid, inflexible procedures were imposed to achieve control
and uniformity; this situation made deviations easier to identify and reindustry was often required to use a
quired less judgment. But as a result,
17
cannon where a rifle would suffice.
The second individual who succinctly articulated the criticism of federal environmental regulation was a corporate official of an energy company who echoed
similar sentiments from the corporate sector:
By 1980, state and local governments were complaining that federal regulation severely hampered their ability to govern. Local needs and priorities were ignored. Governors and mayors were not only excluded from
policy-setting, but were viewed in many cases as adversaries of the national government.
Ultimately, though, it was the staggering cost of compliance that made
the feasibility of the federal regulatory system questionable. The costs of
complying with federal regulations often outweighed the benefits. 18
C FederalLand Management Poh'cy
The Constitution granted the national government plenary power over all
lands under federal jurisdiction.' 9 In interpreting this constitutional grant of
power the Supreme Court stated: "While the furthest reaches of the power
granted by the Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved, we have
repeatedly observed that 'the power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.' ",20
The physical size of the federal land domain is mammoth, encompassing almost one third of the nation's total area; the vast majority lies among the Western states and in Alaska. 21 Numerous federal statutes have been enacted
pertaining to the administration of federal lands by agencies such as the United
States Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management and the National Park
22
Service.
17 Harris & Close, Redefiing the State Regulatory Role, 12 ENvTL. L. 921, 921-22 (1982).

18Lyons, supra note 14, at 935-36.
2;see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 255 (1978); NOWAK,
19U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 124 (1978); see also Kleppe v. New Mexico. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
20 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 at 539 (1976) (citing United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S.
16, 29 (1940)).
21 Federal ownership of the land in the Western states ranges from 87% in Nevada to 29% in Washington. See One Third ofthe Nation's Land, PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION FINAL REPORT (1970);

Engdahl, State and Federal Power over Federal Property, 18 ARIz. L. REV. 283 (1976); Mosher, Reagan and the
Butfor How Long?, NAT'L J., March 21, 1981, at 476.
GOP
2 2 are Riding the Sagebrush Rebellion?
See, e.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1702-1771 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1976 & Supp. III
1979); Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1976); Federal Nonnuclear Research and Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5901-5920 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); The Federal Coal Leasing
Amendments Act of 1975, 30 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978 (Amendment
of FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 (Supp. III 1979); Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of
1980, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (Supp. IV 1980); Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1451-1464 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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Because of the sheer size of federal land holdings in the West, the impact of
federal agency decisions regarding them can be of tremendous import to the
states in which they are located. Regarding federal land management, concerns
and frustrations expressed by the states have recently been reflected in the gradual development of legislative mandates that envision a greater state role in fed23
eral land policy decisions.
D. Critiism of FederalLands Pohcy
Criticism of federal land management policies is abundant, 24 primarily in the
Western states, for the huge size of the federal domain has much more import
there than elsewhere in the country. The critics voice longstanding concerns over
the impact of federal land decisions on the states and their citizens. The "sagebrush rebellion" developed from these concerns.
Governor Bruce Babbitt of Arizona expressed in general terms the frustration
of those who live in Western states where federal agencies control more than half
of the land area:
Federal Lands in the West are generally not subject to any form of
state management or administration. State planning and zoning laws
stop dead at the federal fence. Landlocked cities in need of space to expand are without condemnation power. Western states attempting to
control water appropriations or to regulate groundwater withdrawals
find
25
that their statutes are frequently ignored by federal officials.
Thus, concluded Governor Babbitt:
[T]he considerable support that the Sagebrush Rebellion has gained in
the West reflects a deep-seated frustration with what is perceived to be
heavy-handed,
arbitrary and unreasonable federal regulation of public
26
lands.
23

See generally Babbitt,supra note 11. See FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (1976 &Supp. III 1979) (land use
plans developed by Office of Secretary of Interior to be coordinated with state and local plans to extent
consistent with laws governing administration of public lands); Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of
1975, 30 U.S.C. § 201 (1976) (state governors may object to proposed surface coal mining lease and thus
force reconsideration by Secretary); Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, 43 U.S.C. § 1752(d)
(Supp. II 1978) (leasing allotment management plan may be developed after consulting lessees, permittees); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1345 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (governors of affected
states may submit recommendations to Secretary regarding leasing or development plans). But see proposed Bureau of Land Management (BLM) regulations under FLPMA that would significantly weaken
the requirement that BLM plans be consistent with state and local plans, programs and policies. 46 Fed.
Reg. 57,448-49 (1981). It has been suggested, however, that "there is no assurance that these past initiatives represent a lasting trend toward greater state participation in public lands management." Babbitt,
supra
note 11, at 856-57.
2
4 See generally Coggins, supra note 11, at 539 n. 17, 551-52, 563; Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law
of Pubh Rangeland Management I" The Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1 (1982); A. MacMahon,
The Impact of American Federalism Upon the Management of Land Reserves and the Management of Water Resources
under the American FederalSystem in FEDERALISM: MATURE AND EMERGENT 305-06 (1955); M. CLAWSON &
B. HELD, THE FEDERAL LANDS: THEIR USE AND MANAGEMENT 382-85 (1957); Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
25
26

See Babbitt, supra note 11, at 853.
Id. Criticism in a more specific context is expressed by an Oregon state official:
Those [federal] decisions [construction of an interstate highway and Forest Service action
with regard to allowable timber cut] have had an enormous impact on employment, industrial development, community location or growth, environmental protection, and the aggregate of factors that influence standards of living. Yet these developments came about
primarily because of decisions made at the federal level. For the most part, the decisions
were not even made by elected officials. Legislators have acknowledged that implementation of these policies is so complicated that it must be delegated to administrative agencies.
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E. Si'milar Focus of Criticism
A cursory review of the complaints about the impact of the exercise of federal
power on the states evinces a striking similarity. The alleged arbitrariness of
federal bureaucrats and their often total insensitivity to legitimate state interests
is a common theme of criticism concerning both federal land management and
environmental protection initiatives. 27 Important to the understanding of these
concerns is recognition of the federal regulation techniques that create the regulatory climate for the growth of states' rights protests. The delegation of federal
power to nonelected bureaucrats is a key component of states' rights concerns.
In both the environmental protection and the federal land management areas,
Congress has enacted statutes generally requiring implementation through the
creation of extensive administrative structures. Thus, as is evident in the quotations above, the promulgation of voluminous technical and complex regulations
by federal agencies such as the Bureau of Land Management, the United States
Forest Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Office of Surface
Mining frequently have been the targets of vigorous state attacks on the exercise
28
of federal power.
It is not suprising that these agencies have been the focal point of attack by
states' rights proponents and other advocates of "defederalism." The statutes the
agencies implement often are drafted with vague mandates that give little guidance to agency officials and allow them considerable leeway in interpreting congressional intent. As one commentator has astutely observed,
The fact of the matter is that Congress has virtually relinquished its control function with respect to regulatory management. Control over regulation has not been usurped or wrested away from it by overzealous
regulators; it has been handed over quite willingly. Indeed, the regulatory agency is an institutional form created precisely for the purpose of
relieving Congress of the burden of responsibility for making the 2hard
9
regulatory decisions, which inevitably generate political discomfort.
Consequently, the focus of criticism of the national government's approach to
federal land management and environmental protection is most frequently the
agencies instead of the legislators who created them. 30 The perception that apTo influence such administrative decisions . . . a citizen virtually requires a Washington,
D.C. lawyer and a subscription to the FederalRegister. Unless we understand that centralized
decisionmaking frustrates people who are far away from the "center," we fail to understand
why the Sagebrush Rebellion strikes a responsive chord.
Frohnmayer, A New Look at Federahsm: The Theoy and Implicatin of "Dual Soveregnty," 12 ENVrL. L. 903,
913 (1982).
27 This similarity of criticism in the states' rights-federalism context is, of course, not limited to the two
types of federal activity discussed here. The same complaints are heard across the spectrum of United
States political debate regarding issues as diverse as education, worker safety, consumer protection, and
food and drug regulation.
28 This is so notwithstanding that many of the enabling statutes require these agencies to engage in
some form of "cooperative federalism." See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
29 Davis, Regulato7 Reform and Congressional Control ofReeulation, 17 NEw ENG. 1199, 1232 (1982). The
point here is not that delegation of power to "non-accountable" agencies is either good or bad. Rather,
these comments are intended to identify a most important source of controversy. On the merits of delegation of power to the agencies, one cannot ignore the almost ludicrous specter of Congress debating appropriate ambient air quality standards for a multitude of industries or the necessary timber cut in sectors of
the many national forests. The sheer volume of great and small decisions to be made suggests that some
form of delegation of power is not only desirable but necessary.
30 Agencies and the men and women who run them are not only the whipping posts of states' rights
proponents. Members of Congress "pass the buck" to the bureaucrats often with considerable rhetorical
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for their actions enhances the
pointed bureaucrats are virtually nonaccountable
31
frustration of states' rights proponents.
III. METHODS To LIMIT FEDERAL POWER

If there is a single sentence that summarizes complaints about an unresponsive
and arrogant federal regulatory system, it is the one that expresses the central
theme of President Reagan's "New Federalism": "Get government off the backs
of the people." Extricating, or, perhaps more appropriately, exorcising the federal government from the soul of the body politic can take several forms. The
agenda of federal regulatory critics includes regulatory reform, regulatory relief,
and legislative amendment.
Regulatory reform involves the restructuring of federal agency regulations to
consider more effectively the varied concerns of state and local governments, citizens, business, and industry. The goal of reform is reduction of complexity, regulatory overlap, and overreaching, in addition to an increase in agency
effectiveness and efficiency. Regulatory relief, on the other hand, is a type of
reform that focuses on elimination rather than modification of regulatory strictures. Legislative amendment is a means to adjust federal-state-citizen relationships by modifying congressional enactments. Legislative amendment may
accomplish either of the two other processes itself. It also may enhance decentralization of authority, ultimately reducing or eliminating federal involvement
and transferring power to the states.
Among the regulatory reforms that have been advocated are the following:
executive orders mandating cost-benefit analysis; regulatory impact (economic)
vetoes; sunset review; exanalysis; agency review of existing rules; legislative
32
panded judicial review; and regulatory budgeting.
The methods to reduce federalism in land issues include regulatory relief and
reform as well as legislative amendment. In this context, advocates of the sagebrush rebellion and others who are similarly troubled by federal land management policies have advocated two basic modes of attacking federal evils. Some
believe that a direct transfer of federal lands to the states is the most viable option. 33 Others propose a much closer consulting and collegial relationship between federal agencies and the states regarding public land management decision
34
making.
Potentially the most dramatic development in state-federal relations since the
New Deal is the Reagan Administration's avowed desire to reduce federal power
and authority. The approach includes agency budget slashes, reduction of the
ability of the bureaucracy to exert the full sweep of its power, regulatory impact
agility. The ultimate responsibility for the nature of federal-state relationships lies in large measure at the
feet of those who enact our laws.
3' In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), the Supreme Court
struck down the one-house legislative veto of agency regulations as a technique for congressional oversight
of administrative agencies. Now there exists one fewer method of controlling an allegedly wayward
bureaucracy.
32
See generally Strauss, Regulatoqy Reform in a Time of Transition, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 903 (1981). For
examples of legislative action directed toward regulatory reform, see the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1982), and the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (Supp. IV 1980).
'13See Leshy, supra note I1; Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should Controlthe Publc Lands?, 1980 UTAH
L. REV. 505.
34 See Leshy, supra note I1; Note, supra note 33.
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analysis, and cost-benefit review.3 5
Not the least of Reagan's "New Federalism" initiatives is that which envisions
the elimination or curtailment of federal programs through legislative and/or
administrative action. The Reagan plan also proposes transfer of funds to the
states through "block grants" which do not necessarily require their expenditure
on state programs to replace dismantled federal activities.
IV.

FEDERALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION

Defederalization may take many forms. Its advocates employ stirring rhetoric,
contending that the founding fathers fought in the American Revolution against
the evils of centralized power. They also assert that the cherished architects of
our republic never intended for the central government to assume the incredible
array of powers-at the expense of states and individuals-that it has presently
acquired. A return to the sacred path of "true" federalism charted by the
"founding fathers" is the commonly professed goal of those who seek to defederalize our government.
A healthy concern about the potential hazards of centralized power was, undoubtedly, a principle concern of those who had recently thrown off the yoke of
England. It is by no means obvious, however, that the Constitution they drafted
was intended to institutionalize state sovereignty as a significant limitation on the
exercise of power by the national government. Indeed, it was the obstacles erected by state sovereignty interests which primarily contributed to the demise of
36
the national government created by the Articles of Confederation.
Federalism in the 1980s
How is "federalism" defined in contemporary terms? The answer to this inquiry depends in large part upon the person making the response. A recent observation capsulizes the difficulty in drawing conclusions about modern notions
of federalism: "[T]he federalist principle is the subject of much confusion. To
some, it is a constitutional theory; others deride it as journalistic or political rhetoric. Some see federalism as a code word for racism and retrenchment; others see
'37
it as a symbol of pluralism, local creativity, and experimentation.
While the dimensions of federalism vary greatly depending upon the commentator, certain concrete conclusions are apparent. If one examines Supreme Court
jurisprudence over the last two centuries the inescapable impression is that the
national government plays the predominant role in governing the nation. Court
decisions which have expansively interpreted the Commerce Clause and other
constitutional provisions demonstrate that congressional power is not limited in
38
any meaningful way by notions of state sovereignty.
35
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 12,193 (1981), which sets the general standard by
which all regulations in executive branch agencies must be judged "to the extent permitted by law." The
order requires that no regulatory action be taken unless its potential benefits to society outweigh its potential costs and that, "[almong alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, the alternative

involving the least net cost to society shall be chosen." Id. See also, ROBINSON, GELLHORN & BRUFF, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 149 (2d ed. 1982).
36 See L. LEVY, supra note 2, at 44-60.

37 Frohnmayer, supra note 26, at 905. This article is recommended to the reader as an excellent scholarly and objective discussion of contemporary federalism from the viewpoint of a state official.
3See, e.g., Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia
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Recent Supreme Court decisions place in stark perspective the claims that the
39
Constitution places state and federal sovereignty on equal or near equal planes.
An exception to this general rule however, is embodied in the Court's holding in
NationalLeague of Ct'ties v. Usur .40 In that case, the Supreme Court struck down a
provision of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act which had extended minimum
wage and maximum hour provisions to almost all employees of states and their
political subdivisions.4 ' The Supreme Court relied on the tenth amendment to
the Constitution as the basis for invalidating the challenged provision of the
statute.

42

Until National League of Cties, the tenth amendment had long been viewed as
an impotent obstacle to the exercise of federal power. In an oft quoted passage in
a 1941 decision the Court had summarized the significance of the amendment by
holding that the "amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has
not been surrendered. '43 Commentators were amazed and states' rightists
greatly encouraged with the Court's holding in National League of Cities:
Congress has sought to wield its power in a fashion that would impair the
States' "ability to function effectively in a federal system." This exercise
of congressional authority does not comport with the federal system of
government embodied in the Constitution. We hold that insofar as the
challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States' freedom
to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress . . .44
Many commentators immediately seized on National League of Cities as a target
of review and criticism. 45 What this seemingly aberrant decision promised for

the future of federalism was a question that stimulated much debate and controversy. The answer, however, was soon apparent.
Seizing on the language of NationalLeague of Cities with a vengeance, elements
of the nation's coal industry moved to invalidate the then newly enacted Surface
Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Wichard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11
(1942); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819). See also Corwin, The Passing of Dual
Federahsm, 36 VA. L. REv. 1 (1950); Kurland, A Comment on the SeparationofPower 7, University of Chicago

Occasional Papers (1971); Choper, thfra note 56.
39
See supra note 38 for cases cited therein.
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
4' 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(5) (1976).
42 U.S. CONST. amend. X. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."
43 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). A typical example of the surprise, indeed incredulity, of the response to National League of Cities was one commentator's view that: "[i]f anything seemed
settled in contemporary American Constitutional law, it was the meaning of the Tenth Amendment.
Chief Justice John Marshall stated, almost in the beginning, that the Amendment expressed no limitation
on the powers of the national government. National powers were limited in number, but where they
existed they were complete." Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaningforthe Tenth Amendment?, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 161, 161 (1977).
44 426 U.S. at 852.
45 See, e.g., Barber, supra note 43; Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles." Permutations of "Soveretinty"

in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Stewart, supra note 13; Swartz, National
League of Cities v. Usery, The Commerce Power and State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1115

(1978); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities." The New Federalism and Affmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977). For a more recent analysis of the ongoing debate concerning
the significance of National League of Cities see La Pierre, supra note 6 and Recent Developments, United
States v. Duracell Int'l, Inc., The Tenth Amendment and Environmental Legislation, 13 ENVTL. L. 265 (1982).

1983]

FEDERALISM LIVES

Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977.46 The federal district court accepted the operators' argument in opposing this significant federal environmental legislation. The lower court stated that National League of Cities had "swept
away nearly four decades of precedent and was dispositive of the coal operator's
suit."

47

As in National League of Cities, the plaintiffs have shown that there is a
significant impact on the governmental bodies involved: through forced
relinquishment of state control of land use planning, through loss of state
control of its economy; and through economic harm, from the expenditure of state funds to implement the act and from destruction of the taxing power of certain counties, cities and towns. The act has "substantially
restructure[d] traditional ways in which the local governments have ar'48
ranged their affairs."
Euphoria of states' rightists was shortlived, however, for the Supreme Court
quickly reversed the lower court's holding in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n .49 Recognizing the validity of the "cooperative federalism" approach of the SMCRA, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, wrote:
The most that can be said is that the Surface Mining Act establishes a
program of cooperative federalism that allows the States, within the limits
established by federal minimum standards, to enact and administer their
own regulatory programs, structured to meet their own particular
needs. .

.

. In this respect, the Act resembles a number of other federal

statutes that have survived Tenth Amendment challenges in the lower
federal courts.
A wealth of precedent attests to congressional authority to displace or
pre-empt state laws regulating private activity affecting interstate com50
merce when these laws conflict with federal law.
Justice Marshall rejected any suggestion that the state sovereignty protected
their legislative prerogatives from the grand sweep of congressional power:
Moreover, it is clear that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to
prohibit all-and not just inconsistent-state regulation of such activities. .

.

. Although such congressional enactments obviously curtail or

prohibit the States' prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting
subjects the States may consider important, the Supremacy Clause permits no other result. .

.

. As the Court long ago stated: "It is elementary

and well settled that there can be no divided authority over interstate
commerce, and that the acts of Congress on that subject are supreme and
exclusive."
Contrary to the assumption by both the District Court and appellees,
nothing in National League of Cities suggests that the Tenth Amendment
shields the States from pre-emptive federal regulation of private activities
46 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. 11 1978) [hereinafter referred to as "SMCRA"].
47 Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 432 (W.D. Va. 1980).
8
4 Id. at 435 (citing and quoting from National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 849).
49452 U.S. 264 (1981). See also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981), a companion case similarly
disposing of a tenth amendment argument. See generally McGinley & Barrett, The Commerce Clause and the
Tenth Amendment at Odds: Can theFederal Surface Mining Act Survive National League of Cities?, 8 N. Ky. L.
REV. 107 (1981).
50 452 U.S. at 289-90 (citations omitted).
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affecting interstate commerce. To the contrary, National League of Cities
explicitly reaffirmed the teaching of earlier cases that Congress may, in
regulating private activities pursuant to the commerce power, "pre-empt
express state-law determinations contrary to the result which has com. . . The only
mended itself to the collective wisdom of Congress ......
limitation on congressional authority in this regard is the requirement
be reasonably related to the goal of regulating
that the means selected
51
interstate commerce.
To further dampen the spirits of those who complain of federal usurpation of
states' rights the Court later held in EEOCv. Wyoming that a provision of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act could bar states from discharging a game
warden from employment at age fifty-five. 52 That case is notably similar to the
facts of National League of Cities which involved wages and hours of employment
of local government workers. The Court in EEOC v. Wyoming, however, distinguished NationalLeague of Cities. The Court characterized the thrust of its holding in National League of Cities in the following manner:
NationalLeague of Cities was grounded on a concern that the imposition of
certain federal regulations on state governments might, if left unchecked,
"allow 'the National Government [to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty' " . . . . The principle of [state] immunity articulated in National
League of Cities is a functional doctrine. . . whose ultimate purpose is not
to create a sacred province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the
unique benefits of a federal system in which the States enjoy a "separate
lost through undue federal interand independent existence,". . . not be
53
ference in certain core state functions.
After this decision, any hint in NationalLeague of Cities of a resurrection of state
sovereignty as a viable constitutional counterweight to the exercise of congressional legislative power is an exceedingly slim reed upon which to attach states'
rights hopes. Once again one may confidently conclude that there are no constitutional barriers to congressional displacement of state powers, save the narrow
stricture that the states must continue to exist as entities in the federal system.
Only where "core functions" of a state are impeded does the Constitution shield
54
the states from congressional intrusion on their prerogatives.
Can one then conclude, as Professor Kurland once did, that "[for all practical
purposes, federalism in this country is a thing of the past"? 55 Clearly not. While
the debate about the intentions of the founding fathers regarding the nature of
federalism will doubtless continue unabated, this debate is, after two centuries,
51 Id. at 290-92 (citations omitted). The Court set forth a three part test, each prong of which must be
satisfied, if a litigant is to successfully mount a tenth amendment challenge to federal action:
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulated the "States as States."
Second, the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably "attributes] of
state sovereignty." And third, it must be apparent that the States' compliance with the
federal law would directly impair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions." . . . Demonstrating that these three requirements are
met, however, does not guarantee that a Tenth Amendment challenge will succeed. There
are situations in which the nature of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission.
Id. at 288 and note 29. Seealso EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1055 (1983).
52 103 S. Ct. at 1055.
53
1d. at 1060.
54 Id.
55 Kurland, supra note 38, at 7.
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both academic and unresolvable. While politicians, judges, professors, supporters
of state's rights and others continue to traverse what is now very familiar historical territory, our federal system pulsates with strength and vitality.
How can such a statement be made in light of the strong language of the
Supreme Court in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining andReclamation Ass'n. and EEOC
v. Wyoming? Simply because the Constitution contains few judicially cognizable
legal obstacles to federal ascendency over state sovereignty, does not mean that
federalism has ceased to exist. On the contrary, our federalism is safeguarded not
by the courts, but by extremely vibrant, and over the long term, effective pohtical
constraints. The power of states, local governments, business trade associations,
environmentalists and common citizens to effectively bring pressure on those who
legislate and regulate in state and national governments is the nucleus of federalism. The remedy for federal usurpation of state power is, therefore, political and
56
not judicial.
Why then, one might inquire, has the federalism scale tipped so dramatically
toward the side of the national government? I submit that it is because the sovereign "people" (as in "we the people of the United States") have, in their collective wisdom, judged such a system to most effectively protect and enhance their
57
lives and liberty.
Environmental protection and federal land management are excellent microcosms of this political federalism at work. In the federal lands area, significant
political pressure brought to bear by sagebrush rebels and others has begun to
reap a harvest of greater federal sensitivity to state interests. However, that portion of the "sagebrush" agenda that calls for transfer of ownership of federal
lands to the states has not been well received. This proposal will likely fail because, most Americans, including Westerners, fear that removing federal oversight of vast and precious natural resources of the West will lead to their greedy
and ill-advised exploitation by special interests. A Western governor has aptly
stated this political reality:
The hunters, fishermen, environmentalists, and academics who have
joined in vocal opposition to the Sagebrush Rebellion have a keen sense
of western history. They remember how vast areas of public rangelands
were overgrazed prior to the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934. They remember the intensity of past attempts by special interests to transfer public
lands to private ownership. They know that their historic right of access
to public lands now administered by federal agencies would soon be replaced by locked gates, barricaded roads, and "No Trespassing" signs.
Despite their initial enthusiasm for the rebels' cause, many westerners are
learning that the public interest is best served by maintaining ownership
of the public domain at the federal level. 58
Regarding environmental protection, the politics of federalism is also responsible for the allocation of powers between state and federal spheres. Federal in56

See Choper, The Scope ofludicialPower Vis-h- Vs the States, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1565, 1596-1600 (1977).
57 "The concerns and interests of those seeking benefits from public lands are more likely to be accounted for at the state level. However, a massive shift of authority over all federal lands would be a blow
to individual liberty to the extent that federal reservations like the national parks and wilderness areas
serve an essential function of connecting Americans with the roots of their belief in individual freedom."
Huffman, supra note 11, at 901.
58 Babbitt, supra note 11, at 852.
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volvement did not arise until the utter and dismal inability and refusal of the
states to effectively deal with extremely serious consequences of industrial development became evident. The ability of special interests to influence local and
state legislative machinations created a largely insurmountable barrier to efforts
to control pollution and protect our natural resources on a less than national
scale. Again it was "the people" who provided the political impetus for the
wholesale transfer of environmental protection initiatives from the states to the
national government. Popular sentiment was, a priori, the motivating factor-for
surely such federal initiatives did not result from pressure imposed by state offi59
cials nor from the influence of industry lobbyists.
An excellent case study of federalism at work in the environmental protection
arena is the regulation of the strip mining of coal. History documents the degra60
dation of land and water resources by unregulated strip mining practices. Similarly, history evidences the failure of the states to act in any meaningful way to
bring a halt to a century of land rape. 61 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Pennsylvani'a Coal Co. v. Sanderson advanced a classic statement of state culpability
in environmental crimes of this variety:
The right to mine coal

. .

. [is] a right incident to the ownership of the

coal property; and when exercised in the ordinary manner, and with due
care, the owner cannot be held for permitting the natural flow of mine
water over his own land, into the watercourse ....
The discharge of this
acidulated water is practically a condition upon which the ordinary use
62
and enjoyment of coal lands depends.
[We] are of opinion that mere private personal inconveniences, arising
in this way . . . must yield to the necessities of a great public industry,

which, subserves as a great public interest. To encourage the development of the great natural resources of a country trifling inconveniences to
particular persons
must sometimes give way to the necessities of a great
63
community.
Although the Pennyslvania Supreme Court decided Sanderson in 1886 it was not
64
until almost ninety years later that the court overruled the case.
While mining activities destroyed thousands of miles of streams and ravaged
land to such an extent that it would recover its productivity only over geological
time, most states in the coal regions did little or nothing to control mining activities. Finally, the citizens of the ravaged states clamored for a halt to these activi59 Choper, supra note 56, at 1578.
6°See, e.g., H. CAUDILL, NIGHT COMES To THE CUMBERLANDS

(1963); Begley & Williams, Coal Mie

Water Pollution: An Acid Problem With Murky Solutions, 64 Ky. L.J. 507 (1976); McGinley & Sweet, Acid Coal
Mie Drainage: Past Pollution and Current Regulaittn, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 67 (1978-79); Reitze, Old King Coal and
the Merry Rapists of Appalachia, 22 CASE W. RES. 650 (1971). See also The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. Hearings on HR. 2 Before the House Commttee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st

Sess. (1977).
I" For those who have experienced the literal devastation of land and water resources attendant unregulated coal mining and the concomitant adverse economic impact on mining regions, the use of the term
"land rape" is both justified and appropriate.
62 113 Pa. 126, 146, 6 A. 453, 457 (1886).
63 Id. at 149, 6 A. at 459. The "trifling inconveniences" referred to by the court were the discharge of
acid mine drainage from the company's upstream mine which rendered the water in the stream unfit for
the plaintiff's domestic use and destroyed all fish and other aquatic life therein. Because such discharges
result from a gravity flow of ground water through and from a coal mine, pollution will continue until all
polluting
materials have leached from the soil-a process which goes on in most cases for centuries.
64
Commonwealth v. Barnes and Tucker Co., 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871, 881 (1974).
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ties. They launched a strong effort in the early 1970s to enact national legislation
to deal with strip mining abuses. After a long and bitter fight in Congress, and
two presidential vetoes of similar legislation, the Federal Surface Mining Control
65
and Reclamation Act of 1977 became law.
A statement of a principle sponsor of the SMCRA, Congressman Morris
Udall, is noteworthy:
[We] found that the legitimate and irresistible urge on the part of a state
to protect its coal industry from competitive disadvantage, vis-a-vis coal
producers in other states, usually overwhelmed most state legislatures'
desires to impose sound reclamation laws. Well motivated people on the
state level did what they could, but without
federal standardspotica/real66
it militates in favor of loose controls.
It is the political reality of which Congressman Udall spoke that is the essence
of federalism. Federalism is thus a constantly evolving concept. The ebb and
flow of political tides form and shape the relationships of state and federal government. For example, the play of political federalism with regard to the surface
mining of coal did not end with the passage of SMCRA. In the six years since its
passage, the vitality and the parameters of the cooperative federalism approach
of the statute has been repeatedly attacked from all quarters-states, coal industry, environmentalists, and others. 67 The three options of defederalism referred
65 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. 11 1978). The legislative activity attendant the Act involved 183 days
of hearings and legislative consideration, eighteen days of House action, three House-Senate Conferences
and Reports, eleven Committee Reports, two Presidential vetoes, approximately fifty-two recorded votes
in the House and Senate. See Udall, The Enactment ofthe Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of/977 in
Retrospect, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 553, 554 (1979).
66 Udall,supra note 65, at 553 (emphasis added). The process by which the SMCRA was enacted bears
a considerable resemblance, not only to state and federal legislative activity in general, but also to the
drafting of the Constitution itself. George Washington identified, in his letter transmitting the final draft
Constitution to Congress, the basic constituents of a viable governmental system:
It is obviously impracticable in the federal government of these States, to secure all rights
of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest safety of all. Individuals
entering into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of
the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and circumstance, as on the object to be
obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line between those rights
which must be surrendered, and those which may be reserved; and on the present occasion
this difficulty was increased by a difference among the several States as to their situation,
extent, habits, and particular interests.
In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view, that which appears
to us the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is
involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, led each State in the Convention to
be less rigid on points of inferior magnitude, than might have been otherwise expected; and
thus the Constitution, which we now present, is the result of a spirit of amity, and of that
mutual deference and concession which the pecularity of our political situation rendered

indispensible.
That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every State is not perhaps to be

expected; but each will doubtless consider, that had her interest been alone consulted, the
consequences might have been particularly disagreeable or injurious to others; that it is
liable to as few exceptions as could reasonably have been expected we hope and believe; that
it may promote the lasting welfare of that country so dear to us all, and secure her freedom

and happiness, is our most ardent wish. September 17, 1787.
The process by which the Constitution came into being is not unlike the political federalism that has
marked
the nation's existence since 1787.
67
ee, e.g., Friedman & Braverman, OSM Update-The New Federalism and State Lead. Toxic or Tonicfor the
Coal Industry, 3 E. MIN. L. INST. 5-1 (1982); Lyons, Fderahm and Resource Development. A New Role For
States?, 12 ENVTL. L. 931 (1982); Macleod & Means, The Federal Threat to State Primacy and Effective Reclamation Under the Surface Mining Act, 2 E. MIN. L. INST. 5-1 (1981); Rochow, The Far Side of Paradox. State
Regulation ofthe Environmental Effects of Coal Mining, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 559 (1979); Wooley, The Protection of

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

to above, regulatory reform, regulatory relief, and legislative amendment, have
all been advanced. 68 Attempts at judicial restraint on the exercise of federal
role in the ongoing evolution of state and
power have also played a significant
69
federal regulation of strip mining.
V.

CONCLUSION

One can only speculate on what ultimate shape a comprehensive regulatory
coal mining program will take. What is evident from the strip mining experience
and from many other state-federal clashes, however, is the constant political interplay of many and varied interests. The philosophy of these varied interests are
seldom set in concrete. On the contrary, the industry advocate who presses for
greater state and less federal regulation of an activity may be disappointed to
learn that state regulation is much more detrimental to corporate interests. One
observer has astutely observed that where defederalism occurs, state regulation
may fill the vacuum in an even more intrusive way:
[I]f the primary goal of deregulation is the reduction of government interference in business decisions, deregulation may in many cases be counterproductive and actually create more government regulation. . . . [F]or
certain federal deregulations the resulting state regulation will more than
activity. If true, this finding should give pause
offset the reduced federal
70
to ardent deregulators.
Should the federal lead in environmental protection and federal land management be greatly reduced as the Reagan Administration program portends, it is
likely that an irate electorate could cause the pendulum of federalism to swing in
the direction of even more onerous federal regulation. Such are the vicissitudes
of the federalism where, as in the environmental protection area, the states fail
miserably to protect the interests of the people. Power will flow to the federal
government as a consequence. Where the federal government is insensitive to the
interests of states and the people concerning federal land management issues,
states' rights will be strengthened.
The waxing and waning of the contours of federalism will not occur rapidly.
Rather, it is perhaps the complex and gradual shaping of state and federal relationships by political forces that results in a myopic view of our governmental
system. 7t Placing federalism in historical context and examining it over an extended period highlights the true genius of our institutions. James Madison's
remarks in The Federalist captured the flexibility of federalism:
Hydrologic and Land Preservation Values Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of /977" A Welcome
Reform, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 627 (1979).
68 See supra sources in note 67 for discussion of regulatory reform and relief. Legislative amendment of
the SMCRA is discussed in Abrams, The Rockefeller Amendment. Its Origins, Its Eect and Its Future, 82 W. VA.
L. REV. 1241 (1980); Shostak, The fit and the Pendulum- The Senate and S. /403, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 1221
(1980). Regulatory reform and relief was amajor thrust of the Reagan Administration's "new federalism"
approach to strip mining regulation. See Harris & Close, supra note 17.
69 In addition to the litigation which spawned the Supreme Court decisions in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) and Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981), the
SMCRA has evoked considerable state and federal court litigation attacking the federal regulatory efforts.
See, e.g., cases cited in Friedman & Braverman, supra note 67.
70 Noam, The Interactton of Federaland State Regulation, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 195, 195-96 (1980).
71 The Framers were not ignorant of this phenomenon. Madison, in The Federaht, concluded: "The
proposed Constitution . . . is . . . neither a national nor a federal Constitution; but a composition of
both." THE FEDERAIST, supra note 1, No. 39, at 193.
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If, therefore,

. . .

the people should in future become more partial to the

federal than to the state governments, the change can only result from
manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people ought
not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where
they may consider it most due .... 72
Only the short-sighted would lock our government into rigid state and federal
roles whose alteration would require Constitutional amendment. Those who
wrote the Constitution were not afflicted by political myopia nor have judges
interpreted the Constitution in this fashion. The federal system was intended,
and with the singular exception of the Civil War, has worked much as the founders foresaw. The power of our government surely lies, in reality, not in state
legislatures or the halls of Congress but in the people where it was placed nearly
two centuries ago. As long as robust political debate continues over its attributes
we may rest assured that federalism is alive and well.

72 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 46, at 236. See also, Diamond, The Federalist on Federahm."
'Weither a National Nor a Federal Constitution, But a Composite of Both," 86 YALE L.J. 1273 (1977).

